Research by Professor Hazel Genn showed that in medical negligence cases the average time from issue of proceedings to conclusion is 6 years 5 months; to this figure one has to add substantial periods before commencement of the action. For a case to be more than 10 years old is not unusual.
Medical negligence cases also take longer to settle, on average between 4 and 6 years. An admission of liability is often made years after the material was available to the responsible body for such a decision to be made. In 1993, of all the medical negligence cases set down for trial, 78% were settled after most of the expense had already been incurred. Of the 22% that remained, just under half were settled at the court door or during trial, so that only 13% of the original number were determined at trial. In only 15% of the fully contested cases did the plaintiffs succeed in proving negligence. Perhaps the most interesting statistic of all: over 90% of cases that reached the stage of litigation had the benefit of a legal aid certificate and 92% of successful plaintiffs were legally aided.
Lord Woolf's report included recommendations for case management, alternative dispute resolution including mediation, court-based experts and specialist judges. It is my belief, however, that his proposals may not be sufficient to ensure justice between plaintiffs and health care providers. My thesis is that the unsatisfactory state of affairs that he identified is the result not merely of the procedural deficiencies in the present system but, more fundamentally, of the need to prove negligence in order to receive compensation.
When I was a judge at first instance I found myself, on occasion, obliged to send away a grievously injured plaintiff without remedy. Often the expert evidence called to support the claim was based on assumptions of fact that in my judgment totally undermined the validity of the experts' views. Sometimes, I preferred the weight and quality of the experts called on behalf of the defence. The plaintiffs failed to prove negligence and as a consequence received nothing to alleviate the misery of the rest of their lives. My experience in the Court of Appeal has been similar; my experience as the Chairman of an NHS Trust has also caused me to reflect.
The question must be asked: as a civilized society are we content with a system whereby a person who has by ill fortune suffered grievous injury as a result of medical treatment can be denied all forms of compensation because of the failure to establish negligence? In my opinion, society, government, lawyers, doctors, and judges should consider thoroughgoing change.
There are, I suggest, four options for such compensation in the future:
1 Retaining the status quo 2 An all embracing without-fault insurance scheme 3 Transferring the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant 4 A three-stage scheme that would provide (i) 'in-house' compensation up to a fixed limit (ii) A no-fault compensation scheme with fixed lower and upper limits (iii) For claims above the upper limit, retaining litigation as at present but with the implementation of Lord Woolf's proposals.
Clearly, the first option is no longerjust or acceptable. The status quo, even with implementation of the Woolf proposals, will remain an unsatisfactory basis for compensation.
The second option envisages an across-the-board nofault compensation scheme. The concept of automatic compensation for personal injury has been around for many years. I have been as sceptical as any about adopting this approach. The costs of an all-embracing, no-limit scheme would be prohibitive, and there is a division of views on whether the scheme should include or exclude negligence, or whether state benefits should be taken into account. I doubt whether any government would be prepared to introduce a fully comprehensive mode of compensation.
As to the third option, the concept of the transfer of the burden of proof was examined by the Royal Commission on Personal Injury Litigation. The Committee recommended for consideration that once a plaintiff had established causation for his condition on the balance of probabilities, the burden should pass to the defendant to show that he was probably not negligent. This concept has many advantages. At present, providers (or more precisely those handling the claim) are often content to 'sit it out' in the hope (often realized) that the plaintiff will lose heart, fail to find an expert who will testify, or run out of financial resources or that the legal aid certificate will be withdrawn. The fact that the providers of care would ultimately have to prove to the satisfaction of a judge in open court that they had not been negligent would concentrate their mind at a much earlier stage of a claim. Thus the desire to settle would be brought forward and the case concluded more quickly. Such a change in our jurisprudence might have enabled the unfortunate haemophiliacs who contracted AIDS from contaminated blood concentrates to gain settlements years earlier than they did. Moreover, it would harmonize with what occurs already in Germany and some other member states of the European Union (Spain, Denmark and Belgium). A proposed European Directive embraces the provision of medical services and directs specifics, in essence, that once causation is proved the provider must show that he was not at fault.
The influence of Europe, pressure from consumer lobbies sympathetic to the patients' cause, restraints on public expenditure and lack of judicial and court resources may well cause the British Government to investigate this change as a real possibility. But even if such a change came about, many of the inherent weaknesses of a litigation-based system would remain. It would still be too slow and the cost of disproving negligence would be high.
A THREE-STAGE SCHEME The 'scheme' I propose would allow patients who have against a National Health Service (NHS) hospital in a quicker, more focused and less expensive way. It is a modified basic insurance type scheme, with similarities to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme, with sensible upper and lower limits of compensation.
The defining features are, first, that it would (in the first instance) be confined to cases where the patient in an NHS hospital has suffered an adverse outcome over and above what he or she was expected to achieve (in other words, where, simply, 'something has gone wrong'); and, second, would be based on the provision by statute of a 'no-fault' system of compensation, by excluding all considerations of negligence and culpability.
The cornerstone of the scheme would be a simple Act of Parliament which provided:
1. Any person who is or has been a patient of an NHS trust and proves that a condition from which he is suffering is a probable consequence of medical treatment or the withholding of medical treatment shall be permitted to recover compensation, provided that the person shall not be so permitted if it is proved that the condition complained of was probably: (a) the consequence of the natural progression of disease, or the state of health for which the treatment was prescribed; or (b) an inevitable or foreseeable or predictable consequence of the treatment itself; or (c) a consequence of the ageing process. 2 The Secretary of State may make rules to determine the procedure for the claiming of compensation and the level thereof.
Thus, the first stage in the process would be for the patient to prove that the condition complained of probably resulted from the treatment. It would allow those seeking to defeat the patient's claim to raise the argument that the condition was more likely to have been due to the natural progression of the disease or the state of health for which the treatment was prescribed or an inevitable, foreseeable or predictable consequence of the treatment itself, or the ageing process. Here, the reverse burden of proof would apply, with the hospital required to prove that the condition was probably (a), (b) and/or (c).
Often it will be found the condition complained of is caused only in part by the treatment and that it is also due to one of the provisos. Thus apportionment will arise and the patient will only recover for that percentage attributable to the treatment. This is not a novel concept; it already exists in negligence-based claims, and social security benefit tribunals make such assessments daily.
Paediatric cases deserve special consideration. Some suffered an adverse outcome to recover compensation 5000 babies are born 'damaged' every year but parents 422 rarely succeed in proving negligence. A prenatally damaged baby will still not recover under the scheme: the condition is constitutional and has not been caused by medical intervention. The child who would have been healthy but for the medical intervention will be eligible but subject to the proviso (a)/(b). A 'flawed' fetus who survives the birth process but whose condition is aggravated by treatment or withholding of treatment (e.g. anoxia) must prove the extent of aggravation due to the treatment and so recover proportionately-but subject to the proviso (a)/(b). This would result in more parents' gaining some compensation for a child's injury at birth.
The concept of informed consent could be accommodated within the scheme. The obligation to warn of significant risks (i.e. the Sidaway 10% threshold) would remain on the clinician. If the clinical notes recorded that a warning had been given this would be primafacie evidence that a side effect was foreseeable, indeed foreseen. If the side-effect subsequently occurred any claim would be defeated.
Stage one
Stage one would cover small to modest claims and would be dealt with by the hospital itself. This would require a fundamental change in attitude among health professionals within the hospital. The Clinical Disputes Forum is a body of doctors and other health care workers who act for plaintiffs, defendants and insurers and have been working to devise a protocol. In a report the Forum records:
At present there is often mistrust by both sides. This can mean that patients fail to raise their concerns with the healthcare provider at an early stage, and pursue a complaint or claim which has no or a weak foundation due to a lack of sufficient information and understanding. It can also mean that patients become reluctant, once advice has been taken on a potential claim, to disclose sufficient information to enable the provider to investigate that claim efficiently and, where appropriate, to resolve it. These views are shared by others in this field, notably the Association for the Victims of Medical Negligence. Healthcare providers are criticized for reluctance to be completely honest with patients, failure to provide prompt clear explanations, especially of adverse outcomes (whether or not there may have been negligence) and a tendency to close ranks once a potential claim is signalled.
The Clinical Disputes Forum recognizes that healthcare professionals and providers need to adopt a constructive approach to complaints and claims. They should accept that concerned patients or relatives are entitled to an explanation and an apology (if warranted), and, if injured, encourage, elicit and provide the information necessary to resolve the dispute.
The first constructive step would be to abolish the current distinction between complaints and potential claims and treat them all as complaints, thereby merging the handling procedures. The second step is for each trust to appoint a clinical risk manager (CRM) to consider all complaints by patients. He or she would usually be a doctor, but without any clinical responsibility within the trust. Immediately after receipt of the complaint the CRM would investigate the complaint, obtain all the clinical notes, interview the providers concerned, and determine what probably happened and record it in writing. He would apply the criteria of the scheme-i.e. ignore fault, consider causation and assess whether the proviso applied. He would have power:
(i) to recommend that the complaint was without substance and should be rejected; or (ii) to decide that the complaint had been substantiated and recommend to the chief executive that compensation be paid up to £5000, and for claims up to a maximum of £10000 he would recommend an appropriate figure to the trust board (ii) recommend that the patient receive an apology; and (iv) provide an assurance that the harmful event (if proved) would not occur again (v) in appropriate cases, where clinical ability is in question and there is a real risk of further harm to patients, recommend to the medical director that the 'three wise men' procedure be invoked and, in extreme cases, that consideration be given to disciplinary action.
The target at this level would be for disposal within three months of the complaint. If the patient was not satisfied with the offer of compensation, the case would then be referred to an independent assessor (a doctor in practice), who would have access to all the hospital records. He too would have an inquisitorial role, together with the same powers of recommendation as before. He could also offer to mediate, or invite another to do so.
If this procedure did not dispose of the claim the patient would still be able to begin a negligence action in the county court. The fast-track procedure would apply. All the papers would be forwarded to the court. The case management judge would exercise all his powers, including arbitration and mediation. I venture the view that alongside the 'scheme', litigation at this level would soon become rare.
Finally, if the patient still harboured a grievance he would have access to the Health Service Ombudsman, who 4 to appropriate redress. Thus openness is required, to 423 has limited powers to grant compensation and can require an apology or assurance that the incident will not recur at the hospital. Ultimately, the decision of the Ombudsman would be subject to judicial review. Thus stage one would: address and fully consider the grievance of the patient, at the earliest possible opportunity; and offer the patient compensation in an attempt to dispose of the complaint expeditiously.
Stage two
Stage two covers claims that exceed the local limit. The structure would be provided by a Medical Injury Compensation Authority (MICA) similar to the Criminal Injury Compensation Authority (CICA). This body would have jurisdiction for claims that are worth more than £10000, with a maximum recoverable of £500000. The initial adjudication would be carried out by a single member, probably a doctor. He would be supplied with all the hospital records, and the record of the prior proceedings. He would have full investigative and inquisitorial powers with a view to identifying the issues and establishing the probable facts. His findings would be recorded, and would include an adjudication as to whether the plaintiff had proved causation and if so to what extent, and whether the defendant had proved an exclusion within the proviso, and if so which.
If the complaint was made out and not defeated by the proviso, he would then assess the value of the claim, applying the guidelines for quantification of claims published by the Judicial Studies Board and CICA. A tariff might well emerge. The plaintiff would have to prove any financial loss in the conventional way. All benefits received or anticipated would be taken into account, and the award reduced accordingly.
The adjudicator would recommend a compensation figure either to MICA (when the award fell within the limits) or the trust (where the award was below the lower limit). In appropriate cases-for example, when the prognosis was uncertain, or where there was hardshiphe would have the power to make an interim award.
If either party was dissatisfied he or she would have a right of appeal to an adjudication tribunal who would consider the matter afresh. The tribunal's findings and recommendations would be binding, with no further right of appeal, except by way of judicial review. The chair would be a lawyer, sitting with a doctor and a lay person.
Thus for most cases encompassed by stages one and two, with due diligence on both sides there should be a substantial sum of money available to the patient within, say, twelve months of the complaint. In this way the seriously injured person would have early financial security, enabling him or her to continue the mortgage and other financial obligations.
Private patients in NHS hospitals should not be excluded from the protection of the scheme. However, in their case the fund would be separate from that of the NHS patients and be self-financing under a conventional insurance policy.
The premium would normally be included in the cost of the treatment but the patient would be entitled to contract out.
Stage three
This leaves the cases where the patient has suffered catastrophic injury as a result of treatment and has been left severely injured-for example where a patient has undergone spinal surgery, something has gone wrong, and there is permanent paralysis.
The procedure would be exactly the same. The initial complaint would be made to the NHS trust. The CRM would immediately secure all the clinical records and interview those concerned. He would advise the chief executive and the board of his findings. These would be conveyed to the patient (or in the case of a damaged baby, the parents). The limit of the trust jurisdiction will clearly be exceeded and the trust will take the initiative (rather than wait to be asked) and send all the papers (including the CRM conclusions on factual issues) to the MICA. The board when satisfied on the issue of causation would proceed to make an award to the maximum of £500 000.
If the value of the claim exceeded £500 000 it would still be possible to pursue a common law claim based on negligence. The amount recovered under the compensation scheme would be automatically deducted in full from the courts' final award. Those who had been adequately compensated under the scheme would be highly unlikely to issue proceedings; the grievously injured would have the opportunity to recover the full value of their claim.
In practice the patient, having received the award, would then seek Counsel's opinion. This would be paid for out of the compensation award. At this year's Bar Conference I was told that barristers are reluctant to enter into conditional fee arrangements because, at the time they are invited to do so, the facts will be far from clear and the decision to do so might be based on misconceptions. Under my proposals the outcome of stages one and two would be to create a matrix of factual certainty, determine the issue of causation and indicate the strength or otherwise of the expert opinions, thus enabling the lawyers to make an informed decision. If Counsel concluded that there was no prospect of proving negligence or that there were no realistic prospects of exceeding the award it is unlikely that the client would qualify for legal aid or that the barrister (or solicitors) would agree to a conditional fee arrangement. That would probably be the end of the matter.
If Counsel's opinion was favourable and to the effect that there was a real prospect of proving negligence and of recovering more than the award, the question would arise as to how this proposed litigation was to be funded. The award of compensation could be used to finance the action in the normal way, with the reasonable expectation that any future award or settlement would reimburse the amount spent out of the compensation award. Alternatively, a conditional (not contingent) fee arrangement might be appropriate. The risk as to the payment of the NHS trust's costs would be covered by an insurance policy with the premium paid out of the sum already recovered. The plaintiff might be content to agree to a 100% uplift of fees incurred in recovering the excess over what he has been awarded under the scheme, or even 25% of the amount recovered in excess of the award, whichever is the lower. Moreover, the plaintiff will be made aware that, if there is a payment into court, he will be putting any 'top-up' (and indeed the scheme award itself) in hazard. The defendants too would be able to assess the strength of their case and, if it was weak, would be anxious to effect an early settlement rather than go to court.
The opportunity for early mediation is obvious. I predict that the majority of these large cases, if they survive, will be concerned solely with the quantum of damages where one or other of the parties is being unreasonable.
THE COST
How would these arrangements be financed? As it happens my suggestions coincide with a period of substantial change in the handling of claims within the NHS. The National Health Service Litigation Authority (NHSLA), which came into existence in November 1995, now administers a voluntary scheme which, in effect, almost acts as a mutual insurer of NHS trusts that opt for membership. This is known as the Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts (CNST) and its membership already comprises nearly 90%, about 384 trusts, of those in England. The CNST's coverage is limited to claims involving incidents which occurred after 1 April 1995. Its creation is a positive move that should cause defendants to adopt a more satisfactory approach.
A separate scheme, effective from 1 April 1996 and also administered by the NHSLA, covers all claims against NHS bodies relating to incidents which occurred before 1 April 1995. This is the Existing Liabilities Scheme, under which an NHS body can apply to the NHSLA for reimbursement of any payment out under a claim, provided it has complied with the conditions imposed by the scheme.
The April 1997 edition of Health Care estimated that the outstanding contingency liability is £l1bn. These figures include both awards of damages and a substantial sum for costs. These amounts will have to be accommodated within the NHS arrangements just described. This is an enormous sum of money. If my proposals were accepted, more of the pot would go to the patients and less to legal and administration charges. A cost-benefit analysis (to include the evaluation of time spent in the NHS in investigating and defending claims under the present litigation-only system) is called for and might well reveal that the three-stage scheme could be accommodated within the £lbn. Further savings could be made by raising the lower threshold in line with the proposed increase for the fast track to £15000 and reducing or capping the upper limits at a lower figure, but this would inevitably drive more claims onto the more expensive (and less cost-effective) litigation highway.
ACCESS TO ADVICE
Access to good-quality legal and medical advice would be essential at every stage. At present this is mainly provided by legal aid (remember the 90% figure) . If the current proposals for the curtailment of legal aid take effect, other ways will have to be found to provide this service. A stageone claim would probably not require legal or medical advice at all. If the claim was resisted then the purchasing authority might reasonably provide a first-step advice facility for patients who were aggrieved by the outcome of the services that the authority had purchased for them. There may be a role for the community health councils in this regard. The Citizens' Advice Bureau does good work in sifting and advising in the early stages where litigants in person have problems, and the Bureau could be involved at all three stages. The in-house lawyers could refer the clients to solicitors who would advise whether to apply for legal aid for the more substantial claims. There would be no right of audience for a lawyer at stage one or before the single assessor at stage two, but there would be before the appeal tribunal. Representation at stage three would remain as at present. Thus one can see that there would be a substantial saving of cost, not only to the NHS budget but also to the Lord Chancellor's budget. I urge that the Government or a university undertake a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis to reveal the likely cost of a three-stage scheme. This should take account of the reductions in the costs to the NHS of resisting negligencebased litigation, including an evaluation of time spent in investigating and defending claims under the present litigation-only system and the potential savings to the legal aid budget, and the savings in judicial and court resources by the wholesale reduction of litigation. costs to the NHS for 1996 were L170m and that the 425 Finally, there is one merit to my proposals that is unlikely to feature in a cost-benefit analysis. Those who provide health care at every level are aware of real fear (particularly among young doctors) of being sued for negligence, and worse still of being found negligent. This sword of Damocles above the head of every doctor and nurse, and of some administrators, can lead to the practice of defensive medicine. Stages one and two would carry no hazard of public pillory, and at stage three the hazard would be reduced.
My proposals are far from a perfect solution, but I earnestly believe that they are better than what we have at the moment and are likely to have in the near future. REFERENCE 
